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Abstract
As President Obama is in the midst of deciding whether additional
U.S.combat forces are needed in Afghanistan in addition to the 21,000
troops recently committed, he must realize that additional armed forces
are only a stopgap measure in Afghanistan's downward spiral into an
'undergoverned' failed state. Similarly, as Pakistan's fragile and fractured
civilian government continues to appease the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP), an umbrella organization of Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen with
Taliban cultural values led by Baitullah Mehsud and others, it comes
closer to the concept of a "misgoverned" failed state, possessing a small
arsenal of nuclear arms. The problem for the U.S. administration is that
neither of these countries can be allowed to fall further into disrepair. At
the same time each requires a different and unique approach to the
threat of "Talibanization" that faces each country—the control of territory
within each country by Islamic radicals seeking to impose their
ultraconservative interpretation of shar'ia law onto the general populace.
Generally acknowledged is the belief that what has tentatively worked in
Iraq, that is, the additional U.S. troops and employment of former Sunni
insurgents to help fight foreign fighters associated with al-Qaida, will not
work in either Afghanistan or Pakistan. While a regional approach to the
conflict in these two countries is warranted, Afghanistan and Pakistan
are on two different economic, social, and political playing fields. Hence,
there cannot be a one-size-fits-all solution for the two countries,
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especially one that draws on the Iraq playbook. In addition to its internal
political problems, Pakistan also faces the issue of al-Qaida and Taliban
training camps positioned in its literal back yard, the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA or Tribal Areas). Resolution of the War
on Terror cannot come to fruition without addressing the problems that
exist in the Tribal Areas. This largely self-governed terrain has come
under Taliban influence and serves as a safe haven for Taliban and
foreign-fighter cross-border attacks into Afghanistan and, more recently,
large-scale attacks into Pakistan itself.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security:
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Reviving the United States' 
Commitment to Pakistan and 
Afghanistan
By Steve A. Young, Ph.D. and Imdad Hussain Sahito, Ph.D.
Introduction
As President Obama is in the midst of deciding whether additional U.S. 
combat forces are needed in Afghanistan in addition to the 21,000 troops 
recently committed,1 he must realize that additional armed forces are only 
a stopgap measure in Afghanistan's downward spiral into an 'under-
governed' failed state. Similarly, as Pakistan's fragile and fractured 
civilian government continues to appease the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP), an umbrella organization of Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen with 
Taliban cultural values led by Baitullah Mehsud and others, it comes 
closer to the concept of a "misgoverned" failed state, possessing a small 
arsenal of nuclear arms. The problem for the U.S. administration is that 
neither of these countries can be allowed to fall further into disrepair. At 
the same time each requires a different and unique approach to the threat 
of "Talibanization" that faces each country—the control of territory within 
each country by Islamic radicals seeking to impose their ultra-
conservative interpretation of shar'ia law onto the general populace.
Generally acknowledged is the belief that what has tentatively worked in 
Iraq, that is, the additional U.S. troops and employment of former Sunni 
insurgents to help fight foreign fighters associated with al-Qaida, will not 
work in either Afghanistan or Pakistan.2 While a regional approach to the 
conflict in these two countries is warranted, Afghanistan and Pakistan are 
on two different economic, social, and political playing fields. Hence, 
there cannot be a one-size-fits-all solution for the two countries, espe-
cially one that draws on the Iraq playbook. In addition to its internal 
political problems, Pakistan also faces the issue of al-Qaida and Taliban 
training camps positioned in its literal back yard, the Federally Adminis-
tered Tribal Areas (FATA or Tribal Areas). Resolution of the War on Ter-
ror cannot come to fruition without addressing the problems that exist in 
the Tribal Areas. This largely self-governed terrain has come under Tali-
ban influence and serves as a safe haven for Taliban and foreign-fighter 
cross-border attacks into Afghanistan and, more recently, large-scale 
attacks into Pakistan itself.
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Afghanistan: An Exercise in Persistence?
Three issues stand out when one considers the political, economic, and 
social situation in today's Afghanistan:
1. Since 2005, the Taliban have increased the frequency and lethality of 
their insurgency.
2. It is the world's largest producer of both white and black/brown heroin.
3. Its current government is largely ineffective and corrupt.
These three factors should figure prominently as the U.S. administration's 
Pakistan policy evolves over the coming months.
In October 2001, the United States responded to the tragedy of Septem-
ber 11 by joining forces with the Northern Alliance militia to oust the Tali-
ban from Afghanistan and take revenge upon the al-Qaida leadership. Our 
new ally's charismatic leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud, was assassinated 
two days before the September 11 attacks by suspected al-Qaida suicide 
bombers posing as journalists. In the wake of these events, small groups 
from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) persuaded remaining Northern Alliance leaders that the U.S. mili-
tary was coming to help them take control of Afghanistan. The initial 
coordinated effort was eventually supported by U.S. air strikes. By the end 
of November 2001, the strategic northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif and the 
capital of Kabul were under the control of Northern Alliance forces, thus 
signaling the end of Taliban rule. Kandahar fell shortly thereafter in Janu-
ary 2002, setting up the final push to capture al-Qaida leader Usama bin 
Ladin at Tora Bora, a remote and geographically formidable region 
located in the mountains on the Pakistani border opposite the Pakistan 
city of Parachinar. After several failed attempts to locate and capture ibn 
Ladin, including Operation Anaconda, coupled with inactivity by Ameri-
can commander General Tommy Franks, there was no large U.S. troop 
presence at Tora Bora despite CIA requests, and ibn Ladin escaped with 
likely Pakistani assistance across the Afghan border.3
As a result of the conflict, the United States had relatively quickly pushed 
aside the Taliban and remaining foreign fighters, but not necessarily dis-
mantled their residual fighting capability. Nevertheless, even after having 
missed the chance to capture ibn Ladin at Tora Bora, there at least now 
existed an opportunity for nation building. In the wake of the U.S.-sup-
ported Northern Alliance push, there were opportunities to speedily 
establish a working representative government and begin soft power pro-
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grams to win local Afghan support even while continuing to employ force 
against the Taliban and al-Qaida remnants. Unfortunately for Afghani-
stan and the American publics, the military effort stalled and the hearts-
and-minds program was limited to a few well-meaning and modestly 
effective Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Meanwhile, the Bush adminis-
tration turned its attention to Iraq and essentially abandoned the War on 
Terror in Afghanistan at a time when significant progress was seemingly 
attainable.
From the beginning of 2002 until approximately 2005 the security situa-
tion in Afghanistan remained relatively calm. But in the adjacent border 
area with Pakistan, the Taliban and what was left of the foreign-fighter 
contingent began to reconstitute themselves. Eventually, these forces 
started returning to their former strongholds in southern Afghanistan and 
employing insurgent tactics gleaned from former Iraqi fighters who had 
been displaced by U.S. pressure there.4 As a result, U.S. casualties in 
Afghanistan increased both in terms of quantity and lethality. Throughout 
the 2009 fighting season, the U.S. has remained poised to escalate its 
commitment of armed forces to correspond with anticipated increases in 
the number of U.S. casualties.
Efforts by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and others to 
increase licit commerce in Afghanistan—chiefly by building paved roads—
has also led to increased illicit uses by narco-traffickers involved in mov-
ing raw opium to local laboratories for processing and the final product, 
heroin, to international markets. Over the past few years Afghanistan has 
become the world's largest producer of raw opium and processed heroin. 
Traditionally, the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia, chiefly Myanmar, 
has been the world's primary source of heroin. However, poppy produc-
tion has decreased there by 70 percent, according to Interpol.5 The 
reduced production capacity has been replaced by opium coming out of 
Afghanistan. In 2006, the United Nations estimated that Afghanistan had 
approximately one hundred and sixty-five hectares in poppy production 
yielding approximately six thousand metric tons of raw opium. If one 
assumes a ten-to-one ratio of raw opium to heroin product, then the yield 
of heroin was six hundred metric tons that year. In January 2008, the 
average price in Afghanistan for one kilogram of dry opium was US$106. 
It is extremely difficult to quantify the amount of money derived from the 
drug trade going to Taliban and al-Qaida coffers; however, one estimate 
placed Taliban earnings in the US$1 billion range over the last ten years.6 
Afghanistan's president Hamid Karzai, head of a corrupt and mostly inef-
fective government, stood for reelection in August of 2009.7 The United 
States backed Hamid Karzai because he was among the few Afghan elite 
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that stayed behind in the 1979–1989 fight against the Soviet Union. While 
not an active fighter, Karzai was a significant fundraiser during the war 
and a political presence in southern Pakistan and Afghanistan afterwards. 
Moreover, his English language and political skills and his being ethnic 
Pashtun, the dominant ethnic group of the country, seemed a winning 
combination for the Afghan presidency. However, Karzai has proved to be 
ineffective when dealing with former warlords and even members of his 
own family regarding political corruption and involvement in the drug 
trade.
The Situation in Pakistan
Pakistan's current problems stem from a series of mostly ineffective and/
or corrupt governments since it was founded in 1947. For more than a 
decade, the government has failed to control its borders in the FATA and 
to effectively respond to a homegrown Taliban insurgency.
After the creation of Pakistan, the government adopted policies toward 
the FATA inherited from British colonial rule. Special regulations under 
the traditional local system were adopted. Not only were people allowed 
to keep their weapons without any government licensing, but these areas 
proved to be centers of arms production, whence they were supplied ille-
gally to the rest of the country and Afghanistan. Many hardened criminals 
from other parts of the country obtained refuge there because of the 
absence of Pakistani law. The FATA also served as a source of mujahideen 
during the 1979–1989 conflict with the USSR.
Pakistan's political history chronicles the actions of a series of military 
and civilian governments, none of which has been particularly effective in 
solving Pakistan's persistent political and economic problems. Pakistan's 
deep flaws in governance began almost as soon as its first leader, Muham-
mad Ali Jinnah, died, little more than a year after its independence. A 
series of military and civilian leaders followed, setting the stage for Gen-
eral Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's military takeover of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's 
government in July 1977.
An avowed Islamist, Zia began establishing Pakistani madrassas (Islamic 
religious schools that tend toward extremist ideology) built with Saudi 
Arabian funds and staffed by Saudi Imams preaching the very conserva-
tive Wahhabist brand of Islam. The number of Pakistani madrassas 
increased substantially during Zia's rule and formed the ideological and 
numerical basis for what was to become the Taliban, or "religious stu-
dents" in the Arabic language. Following Zia's death in 1988, Ali Bhutto's 
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daughter, Benazir Bhutto, and Nawaz Sharif alternately shared the prime 
minister's office until 1999, when Pervez Musharraf displaced Sharif by 
military coup.
Musharraf eventually assumed the presidency until August 2008, when 
he resigned under pressure from the new civilian government. Asif Ali 
Zardari, Musharraf's successor and widower of Benazir Bhutto, previously 
served two separate jail terms for corruption and accusations of murder. 
Musharraf's internal security policy was one of appeasement with the 
Pakistani Taliban as they extended their influence beyond the Tribal 
Areas into the Swat District of northern Pakistan. Such appeasement was 
the hallmark of the fractious state of control over Pakistan's domestic and 
international affairs. Moreover, radical Islamists have recently attempted 
to assert control over even more of Pakistan through violence, a situation 
that has raised concerns in the Obama administration about the security 
of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.8
Sometimes it is difficult to assess where the real power lies in Pakistan as 
there are four potential power centers: the president, the prime minister, 
the chief of the army staff, and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief. 
That the Afghan Taliban had been supported both in terms of finance and 
manpower by the Pakistani ISI since their inception had been rumored 
within U.S. intelligence circles for many years and only recently 
confirmed by media reporting.9 The ISI had always assumed that it could 
control the Taliban, but has since found out that the Afghan Taliban have 
their own agenda: to continue the fight against the United States in order 
to regain sovereign control of Afghanistan. The Pakistanis had assumed 
the view that the Taliban were a friendly alternative to an Indian-
influenced Afghanistan. However, since their ejection from Afghanistan, 
the Afghan Taliban and foreign fighters present in the Tribal Areas began 
radicalizing conservative Islamists in the Tribal Areas, especially in 
Southern Waziristan. The new Pakistani Taliban quickly spread into 
North Waziristan, then further northward through the Khyber Agency to 
its terminus in the Bajaur Agency.
The term "Talibanization" was first used to describe the Pakistani Taliban 
taking over or highly influencing the political and social structure of the 
Tribal Areas.10 Such takeovers have been facilitated by numerous Paki-
stani Government agreements with the Pakistani Taliban; an appease-
ment exercise that has yielded none of the peace elements promised by 
the Pakistani Taliban. This futile policy of appeasement culminated in 
December 2008, with the Pakistani Taliban takeover of the Swat Valley 
located in Swat District of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province 
(NWFP). Girls now no longer attend school there and the District is sub-
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ject to shar'ia law. The area under Taliban influence or direct control now 
extends throughout the Tribal Areas into northern Pakistan.
The Taliban have extended their attacks from the FATA to Pakistani 
major cities including Lahore. Moreover, the number of suicide attacks 
inside the country has become so common that people feel insecure to 
walk in the cities. Thousands of people have been killed and properties 
destroyed. The following table demonstrates the result of violence in Paki-
stan between 2003–2008.
Source: Institute for Conflict Management (SATP)
Institute for Conflict Management (SATP) and Pakistan Assessment 2009, 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/.
One result of Pakistani military operations has been a humanitarian crisis 
not seen in recent years. According to the NWFP government, the number 
of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) has exceeded three million. These 
people have migrated to various parts of the country and have severely 
stretched the capacity of the Pakistani Government to provide food and 
shelter for the refugees. 
Annual fatalities from terrorist violence in Pakistan, 2003–2008
Year Civilians Army 
personnel 
Terrorists Total 
2003 140 24 25 189
2004 435 184 244 863 
2005 430 81 137 648 
2006 608 325 538 1471 
2007 1523 597 1479 3599
2008 2155 654 3906 6715
Total 5291 1865 6329 13485
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A Comprehensive Regional Strategy for Afghanistan
Recently, President Barack Obama announced that there would be a 
regional strategy directed at stemming the influence, reach, and lethality 
of al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. His secretary of 
state, Hillary Clinton, appointed former U.S. ambassador Richard 
Holbrooke to serve as Special Representative to both countries. In 
addition there will be more diplomatic and civilian personnel assigned to 
Afghanistan to try to help rebuild the country's political and economic 
infrastructures. While these initiatives are sound efforts, neither 
diplomatic nor infrastructure improvements can be made without 
increased security in the countryside. However, new boots on the ground 
will not achieve the president's stated goal of destroying al-Qaida because 
(a) the administration maintains the policy of no hot pursuit into the 
Tribal Areas, and (b) an increase in troops will only serve to solidify 
government control in urban areas while the Taliban potentially retain 
control over the rural areas. Therefore, the administration should have a 
different goal than their predecessors: that of controlling territory.
All too often, U.S. troops clear an area of Taliban then leave, only to have 
the Taliban return and wreak vengeance on the village for cooperating 
with the enemy. Upon returning to a previously "liberated" village, U.S. 
commanders frequently find friendly but not necessarily cooperative 
inhabitants. The recently enacted "take and hold" policy of capturing and 
occupying local towns with friendly forces, however, may convince villag-
ers and the village elders that the United States will protect them from the 
Taliban. This is likely the only policy that could succeed in Afghanistan as 
no counterinsurgency program can succeed without the support of the 
general population.
The Afghan Army is a well-respected institution amongst the population, 
but the police are among the most corrupt of public servants. Drug money 
influences their decisions and undermines any semblance of the rule of 
law. This is relatively understandable as the police are grossly underpaid, 
if at all, and their training is superficial at best. Nevertheless, the police 
and the army are those who are most acquainted with local problems and 
presumably know what is happening in their areas of operation. There-
fore, it would appear necessary to initiate a concerted countrywide effort 
to upgrade the army's training in counterinsurgency techniques and tac-
tics, and to train and outfit local police forces using a similar template 
applied by U.S. forces in Iraq. In addition to basic police investigation 
techniques, chief among the training topics should be classes in ethics and 
rule of law. These concepts have to become inculcated within law enforce-
ment in order to gain some respect and trust from the local populations.
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At this time, there are few details about which additional U.S. civilians 
would be encouraged to go to Afghanistan, but personnel from the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) are ideal given their 
depth of expertise in all facets of development including economics, edu-
cation, environment, and health issues. Therefore, increases in USAID's 
budget are essential in order to get the necessary expertise into the coun-
try. Once security improves via the aforementioned take-and-hold policy, 
international NGOs should be encouraged to return to these secure sites. 
The culmination of these synergistic factors would go a long way toward 
social, political, and economic reconstruction and development.
Beyond the efforts of USAID, additional capability is needed in the form 
of a reconstituted U.S. Information Agency (USIA), which was disestab-
lished as a post-Cold War dividend. Dissolved in 1999, USIA was a part of 
public diplomacy that never received much attention in the United States, 
but was well known overseas. For over forty years, this government 
agency, known as the U.S. Information Service (USIS) overseas, was an 
oasis in foreign territory for persons wanting to read English language 
newspapers and magazines and take English language lessons. Although 
sometimes portrayed as a U.S. propaganda vehicle, in actuality, USIS 
served as an informal U.S. cultural center for persons not wanting to be 
identified as visiting the local U.S. embassy or consulate. If winning 
hearts and minds is an Obama administration goal, then the public diplo-
macy plan for Afghanistan should be a key component of the overall strat-
egy regarding the country.
Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking
While extra boots on the ground and additional civilian personnel are key 
to stabilizing Afghanistan, what has not yet been discussed in any detail 
are plans for addressing poppy production and introducing the concept of 
replacement crops or other tactics intended to remove reliance on the 
production of illicit drugs. Any move to block opium income, however, 
will be viewed as widely unpopular. One only has to see the issue from an 
Afghan farmer's perspective to see why: opium production yields approxi-
mately US$2,154 per acre, while irrigated wheat generates approximately 
US$230 per acre, and dry wheat farming generates only about US$113 per 
acre.11 With this reality, one can only accomplish so much nation building 
with troops and soft power.
The underlying cause of the grief of Afghanistan, and indirectly Pakistan, 
is the thriving drug trade in these countries, and it will continue to mire 
Afghanistan in the third world unless it is addressed. Most important will 
be cutting off access to the money generated by the sale of opium and 
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heroin.12 This lesson was learned in the 1980s drug wars against the Cali 
Cartel in Colombia. Two items are necessary to have a successful 
insurgency: a modicum of popular support and financial resources. 
Therefore, in order to defeat an insurgency each of these factors must be 
successfully addressed. The combination of hard and soft power will 
increase security and popular support. A reduction in financial resources 
can only be achieved by going after the drug trade, an effort in which 
many lessons were learned under the auspices of the U.S. sponsored 
Andean Initiative and the efforts of current Colombian President Álvaro 
Uribe Vélez.
Like an insurgency, success against the drug trade requires a combination 
of hard and soft powers as well as the political will of the host govern-
ment. Active pursuit of the Taliban will create some success against the 
heroin trade, but the Taliban are not the only ones involved in the drug 
trade. It may be easier initially to address the growers. One suggestion has 
been for pharmaceutical companies to purchase more legally grown raw 
opium.13 On the surface, this idea has merit as there would be market 
forces deciding the product's price. Addressing illicit poppy production, 
then, becomes the underlying solution to Afghanistan's problems. Take 
away the proceeds from the sale of heroin and the Taliban's fiscal 
resources eventually dry up or are seriously curtailed. It is doubtful that 
Pakistan or other countries could or would want to make up the funding 
differences for any sustained time period. Since the drug trade is also the 
source of Afghanistan's political corruption, take away the illicit profits 
and corruption declines to a rate normally associated with developing 
countries.
U.S. Strategy in Pakistan
President Obama's strategy for Pakistan appears much less clear, but no 
less difficult. As the United States prepares to send more troops to 
Afghanistan, it also needs to address the stability of neighboring Pakistan. 
Unfortunately, there appears to be little change in the two-prong policy of 
the previous administration: more Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
Predator and Reaper drone attacks in the Tribal Areas and aid money for 
Pakistan, much of it directed to the military. Unfortunately, while 
appearing necessary to keep the pressure on al-Qaida and Pakistani 
Taliban elements in the Tribal Areas, the UAV attacks are becoming more 
known for indiscriminate civilian killings while achieving occasional 
success against high-value targets. Generally these attacks are considered 
negatively and not fruitful for the cause. In the absence of a persistent and 
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effective Pakistani army presence, there appears to be no other military 
alternative in the short term. These attacks do nothing, though, for 
winning grass-roots local support.
Money for Pakistan has been squandered in the past and there is little rea-
son to think that future financial outlays will not follow suit. Recent 
attacks in Lahore by elements of either Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)14 and/
or the Pakistani Taliban have highlighted the Pakistani Government's 
inability to deal with these homegrown terrorists.15 Moreover, these 
attacks indicate the increased confidence and ability to reach beyond the 
Tribal Areas and these groups' main bases of support. LeT, once highly 
supported by the ISI for the Kashmir insurgency, has now turned its 
attention to destabilizing Pakistan's central government and was linked to 
the November 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai. The Pakistani Taliban's 
goal is to turn the country into some semblance of Afghanistan. Any mea-
sure of success by either group or combination of these and other like-
minded groups would lead to a significant destabilization of the Pakistani 
Government.
In order to comprehensively address these issues, a multifaceted 
approach to Pakistan's insurgency problems should be developed in con-
cert with the Afghan program. Of course, there will be additional U.S. 
funding for training Pakistan's armed forces and hopefully police as well. 
But, the U.S. effort must be coordinated between and within each country, 
because neither country's insurgency or terrorist problem can be solved 
independently of the other. However, if any of these problems are to be 
solved, or at least contained, one must attack the source of the problem: 
radicalization and instability in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas.
Threat of Radicalization in the FATA
Since their eviction from Afghanistan, the Taliban and al-Qaida have 
reconstituted themselves in what has become an insurgents' safe haven. 
The FATA were used consistently during the war between 1979 and 1989 
with the Soviet Union for the same purpose, and their use is one of the 
reasons the mujahideen were able to keep fighting during that time 
period. Currently, the FATA are home to those most likely to attack the 
Pakistani state and its American allies. That the FATA harbor what the 
United States considers high-value targets is evident in the number of 
UAV attacks launched in the area.16 Terrorist training camps once found 
in Afghanistan are now active there, and successful attacks on U.S. con-
voys bearing supplies for the war in Afghanistan originate from the 
FATA.17 
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The Pakistani Taliban was organized in South Waziristan and its influ-
ence has extended northward to Bajaur Agency and into the Swat District, 
threatening Pakistan proper, with Islamabad, the nation's political capi-
tal, only one hundred miles from Swat. The Tribal Areas are also home to 
many heroin processing laboratories. Logic therefore dictates that to be 
successful in either Afghanistan or Pakistan, what must be addressed are 
the issues that make the people of the Tribal Areas susceptible to Taliban 
recruitment and the cultural traditions that offer safe harbor to the Tali-
ban and foreign fighters, such as Pashtunwali. The goal is to develop an 
approach or policy that offers an alternative to the Taliban in Pakistan's 
FATA.
Although a very difficult task, there are several initiatives that can be 
implemented while being sensitive to the cultural realities of the Tribal 
Areas. To date, Pakistan's policy toward the Tribal Areas has been to 
either militarily root out foreign fighters and Islamic extremists or 
appease extremists bent on establishing the Taliban creed in Pakistan. 
What has not yet been attempted is a sustained effort at economic devel-
opment within the Tribal Areas. For economic development to have a 
chance to succeed, however, basic infrastructure development in the form 
of roads and bridges and the creation of additional border crossings 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan must be constructed. The long-term 
goal should be to establish the Tribal Areas as a free trade zone, drawing 
foreign direct investment from Arab, Western, and Asian sources. Cur-
rently, hard-top roads in the Tribal Areas are poorly maintained and most 
are dirt track. This hampers incidental travel and commerce within the 
Tribal Areas and creates a more insular society. Moreover, a more effi-
cient transportation system can only help farmers and tradesmen get 
goods and services to market in a timelier manner that reduces loss of 
fresh produce and increases quantity of scale for other goods.
Requisite in any comprehensive regional strategy for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan is creating additional controlled border crossings within the 
Tribal Areas. Presently Pakistan and Afghanistan share a one-thousand-
six-hundred-mile border, but maintain only two official border crossings. 
In Pakistan there is one border crossing northwest of Peshawar at 
Torkum and another at Chaman, located northwest of Quetta in 
southwest Pakistan. Spin Boldak is Chaman's corresponding Afghan 
border town while there is no official Afghan town opposite Torkum (in 
comparison, the border between the United States and Mexico is slightly 
greater than one thousand nine hundred miles and runs through four U.S. 
states and six Mexican states; in Texas alone there are twenty-six official 
border crossings). The road to Torkum is via the tortuous and infamous 
Khyber Pass, which has been subject to many recent attacks on NATO 
Young and Sahito: Reviving the United States' Commitment to Pakistan and Afghanista
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
Journal of Strategic Security
28
convoys by militants and Pakistani bandits.18 Having only two official 
border crossings presents challenges to govern or secure legal commerce 
and prevent widespread banditry.
The addition of controlled border crossings would result in an immediate 
increase in commerce between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Additional bor-
der crossings also have the advantage of creating additional tax revenues 
from customs fees and tariffs. There should also be greater cross-border 
cooperation between the two countries since the majority Pashtun ethnic 
group transcends both sides of the border. Extended families on both 
sides of the border may also welcome the additional convenience of ease 
of passage between the two countries. Choosing locations of additional 
international border crossings would not be difficult. One immediate can-
didate is the Afghan town of Khost. The nearest Pakistan Tribal Area town 
is Miram Shah and there are numerous informal trails leading to the bor-
der on both sides used by militants to fire on U.S. and allied troops sta-
tioned in Khost. Creating additional international border crossings is a 
concrete confidence-building measure that would link these two neigh-
bors and provide needed security and stability without undue fear of 
attacks from militants.
Conclusion
There are many sources of conflict and internal pressures facing 
Afghanistan and Pakistan; the Obama administration is right to consider 
a regional approach to formulating U.S. policy on these two strategic 
South Asian countries. Both countries are facing their own versions of 
homegrown insurgencies and both countries suffer from ineffective 
governments. Central to the violence impacting both countries are 
Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, which also serve as a safe 
haven for the Taliban and terrorists waging war against the United States 
and its allies.
Possible common solutions applicable to both countries include the addi-
tional build up of exogenous armed forces and the provision of qualified 
training for local police. Moreover, soft-power activities such as increased 
diplomacy in both countries and convincing regional powers such as Iran 
and Russia that a stable Afghanistan is in their best interest could be an 
effective approach, especially when used synergetically with other mili-
tary force. Additional USAID projects and a robust public diplomacy pres-
ence in certain areas also seem appropriate. In addition, Afghanistan 
faces a debilitating poppy production problem that also must be taken 
into account.
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 2, No. 4
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss4/2
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.4.2
Reviving the United States' Commitment to Pakistan and Afghanistan
29
In all respects, Pakistan's Tribal Areas are the source of many of the prob-
lems of both countries. It would seem appropriate that government stake-
holders from both Pakistan and Afghanistan seek common ground to 
work against the insurgency by creating greater economic access to each 
country's goods and services by making the FATA a free trade zone, while 
simultaneously working to create binational institutions for management 
of their border problems.
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